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SOCIAL DILEMMAS IN RIDESHARING    
 
When a Few Undermine the Whole:  
A Class of Social Dilemmas in Ridesharing 
 
Abstract 
We investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise when a heterogeneous group of agents 
potentially benefit from a joint enterprise such as ridesharing. Participation in the enterprise incurs 
positive externalities to other participants; social welfare is maximized with full participation. 
However, if some agents find it a dominant strategy to opt out, then the potential benefit from the 
enterprise will decrease, leading to more members opting out. This iterated disincentivizing effect 
could result in massive welfare losses. We construct a game-theoretical model to implement these 
social dilemmas and report experimental evidence for their existence and welfare impact. 
 
Keywords Social dilemmas; Ridesharing; Cost-sharing; Route choice in traffic networks; 
Heterogeneous agents; Experiment 
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 A class of social dilemmas in ridesharing and similar joint enterprises 
 A few individuals might find it always preferable to opt out 
 Benefit of the initiative decreases as a result, leading to further opting out 
 Could result in massive losses in social welfare 
 Theoretical and experimental evidence for their existence and welfare impact 
  




When a Few Undermine the Whole:  
A Class of Social Dilemmas in Ridesharing 
 
1  Introduction 
New communication technologies have led recently to the blossoming of ridesharing public 
services such as Uber and Lyft. These operators provide service for areas that are not served well, 
or not served at all by public transportation, and often act as a transit system feeder. They attract 
customers largely for the lower transportation cost they provide compared with other available 
options. Reduction of transportation cost is critically dependent on the number of the participating 
customers: the higher the number of participants in ridesharing, the lower the shared cost, and the 
more benefit the customers reap from the arrangement.  
In this study, we investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise in ridesharing and similar 
joint enterprises with positive externalities. The decision situation that we study involves 
independent network users choosing the same transportation mode and sharing the travel cost 
equally. In the social dilemmas that emerge from the situation, a majority of the users would have 
benefitted from ridesharing as long as there was a high level of participation because of the 
associated positive externalities. Yet, the user population could still end up with a high level of 
non-participation, or even complete non-participation. The reasons are as follows: some (perhaps 
only a small minority) of the individuals might find it always preferable to opt out from ridesharing 
because their private costs are very low compared to the others. If that happens, then the potential 
number of participants decreases, so that the potential benefit from the joint initiative also 
decreases, leading to further opting out by more users. This iterated disincentivizing effect – in 
fact, a manifestation of the iterated elimination of dominated strategies – might then result in a low 
participation level, or even complete non-participation, and massive welfare losses.  




Similar outcomes may appear in other scenarios that are different from ridesharing. The 
common feature of these scenarios is that they involve participation in a joint enterprise (e.g., 
construction of a community swimming pool), so that the enterprise is more beneficial to group 
welfare the higher the number of participants. If some individuals in the group prefer to opt out 
from the joint enterprise, then the potential number of participants decreases and, consequently, 
more group members opt out. The iterated disincentivizing effect could again result in massive 
losses of group benefit. Schelling (1978, p.102-110)’s “dying seminar” model has related insights. 
In his model, people attend a seminar only if a critical mass of other people are expected to attend, 
and different people may have different critical masses. In our model as well, different players 
have different critical masses for ridesharing to be preferable to private transport. Some players 
may have critical masses that are well below the maximum potential number of ridesharing 
participants; however, both our theoretical and empirical findings show that even those players 
could eventually opt out of ridesharing. Another comparable model is Dixit (2003)’s club game. 
The model involves similar positive externalities as ours, while the analysis focuses on how the 
presence of one player, to whom joining the club is a dominant strategy, can ultimately lead to all 
players joining – an outcome that might be socially suboptimal. Breitmoser, Tan, and Zizzo 
(2014)’s experimental test of an extensive-form version of Dixit’s model shows considerable 
adherence to equilibrium predictions, but also evidence of bounded rationality. Here, we look at a 
relatable setting in the context of ridesharing but focus on “flip-side” social dilemmas in which no 
players join the “club” of ridesharing even though all might have benefitted from it.   
After reviewing relevant literature, in the following sections we construct a ridesharing 
model to demonstrate the social dilemmas. The model is structured as a traffic network game that 
presents group members a choice between traveling alone on a route with an individual private 




cost that is heterogeneous among the group members or, alternatively, traveling with other group 
members and sharing the joint travel cost equally. To account for the individual choices, we 
compare to each other two outcomes: an equilibrium solution derived from non-cooperative game 
theory, which is suboptimal for the group, and another non-equilibrium outcome that maximizes 
the group social welfare. We then report a behavioral test of the model by means of an experimental 
game with two between-group conditions. One condition has a unique corner-solution equilibrium 
with no players choosing ridesharing; the other has a unique interior equilibrium with half of the 
players choosing ridesharing. For both conditions, we obtain consistent experimental evidence for 
the existence of the theorized social dilemmas as well as their welfare impact. 
Our study makes several contributions to previous research on social dilemmas. First, we 
propose a class of social dilemmas that are quite different in nature from well-known major social 
dilemmas (see e.g., Mak and Rapoport 2013). Social dilemmas in public goods games, including 
classic versions with symmetric payoff functions and no-contribution equilibria (see Ledyard 
1995), or modified versions with asymmetric payoff functions and interior equilibria (e.g., 
McGinty and Milam 2013), are typically driven by free riding on non-excludable public goods. In 
our model, the social dilemmas are induced by players who opt out of an excludable joint initiative. 
Consider also the standard threshold public goods game (e.g., Croson and Marks 2000). The game 
has more than one feasible outcome according to game theory analysis using the concept of Nash 
equilibrium; one of these equilibrium outcomes leads to provision of the public good and 
maximizes the welfare of the group. The social dilemma occurs where, behaviorally, individuals 
fail to coordinate on that optimal equilibrium outcome but instead converge to inferior equilibria 
(see Van Huyck et al. 1990, 1991, for similar issues in general coordination games, and Liu, Mak, 
and Rapoport 2015). A crucial point is the dynamics of mutual influence among individuals upon 




repeated interactions, which is often the key to whether the group converges to either an optimal 
or an inferior outcome. As such, the inferior outcome might only emerge gradually over the course 
of the experiment. By contrast, in the scenarios investigated in the present study, the only 
equilibrium outcomes are suboptimal, and the social dilemmas occur with certainty.  
Secondly, through our experiment we offer behavioral evidence for the theorized social 
dilemmas in terms of both their existence and drastic welfare impact. In our experiment, it appears 
that the iterated disincentivizing effect had played out as part of the strategic decision-making 
process of the participants before they made their decisions. As a result, in either of the two 
experimental conditions, inferior group outcomes appeared from the very start of the session and 
did not improve as the session progressed.  
Thirdly, the social dilemmas emerge from a route choice setting in a traffic network with 
a ridesharing option. It adds behavioral perspectives and empirical evidence to theoretical studies 
on cost sharing (see, e.g. Moulin 2003), and similar situations could occur in more general 
instances of joint enterprises. As such, our work also contributes to research on interactive 
behavior by illustrating a new class of social dilemmas in the context of directed networks. 
2  Experimental Literature Review 
Previous literature on social dilemmas includes both theoretical and experimental studies and 
stretches back several decades. The relevant points of connections with the present study are as 
discussed above. Reviews of the literature appear in Croson and Marks (2000), Chaudhuri (2011), 
Dawes (1980), Ledyard, (1995) Mak and Rapoport (2013), Messick and Brewer (1983), Van 
Lange et al. (2013), Zelmer (2003), and others. Here, we provide a brief review of the experimental 
literature related to the other major aspect of our work, namely, route choice in directed networks 
– a literature that has been growing rapidly in recent years and, therefore, might be less familiar. 




There is a rich theoretical literature on choice of routes in directed networks in which 
traversal across any edge (link) could only be in one direction (see, e.g., Nisan et al. 2007; 
Roughgarden 2005). The theoretical literature has instigated much experimental research in which 
choices of route are examined in controlled laboratory settings under strategic uncertainty. Routes 
are typically chosen by members of small groups who submit their decisions independently. Their 
decisions are decentralized, and they are typically homogenous in incentive terms. This stream of 
research might be traced back to the seminal paper by Pigou (1920) on directed networks with 
only two routes that connect a single origin and a single destination. One of the routes has a fixed 
travel cost and is consequently not susceptible to congestion, and the other has a variable travel 
cost that increases linearly in the number of its users.  
Pigou’s canonical example was examined in later experiments on route choice by Iida, 
Akiyama, and Uchida (1992), Selten et al. (2007), Knorr, Chmura, and Schreckenberg (2014), and 
Mak, Gisches, and Rapoport (2015) among others. The results of these studies support equilibrium 
predictions for aggregate, but not individual, choice behavior. Other route choice experiments that 
involve complexities such as exogenous risks (Lu et al. 2014) reveal more significant deviations 
from equilibrium predictions; these results have prompted researchers such as Dixit and Denant-
Boemont (2014) and Wijayaratna et al. (2017) to interpret the deviations with modified 
equilibrium concepts. A related topic is the study of departure time in transportation networks with 
bottleneck congestion (see, e.g., Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey 1990 for a theoretical treatment). 
Gabuthy, Neveu, and Denenat-Boemont (2006) find significant deviations from equilibrium in 
their experiment with a simple bottleneck. Daniel, Gisches, and Rapoport (2009)’s experiment, 
which involves a more complex two-bottleneck setting, reported results that were more consistent 
with equilibrium predictions at an aggregate level, probably because the experiment involved as 




many as 50 rounds of play – compared with Gabuthy et al. 2006’s 15 rounds of play – to facilitate 
learning.    
Pigou (1920) also has given rise to experimental research on several traffic paradoxes in 
congestible networks. Morgan et al. (2009) and subsequently Hartman (2012) conducted 
experimental studies of the Pigou-Knight-Downs paradox, which states that expanding the 
capacity of a road segment with the intention to reduce congestion may not reduce travel cost 
because it may elicit new demand. Denant-Boémont and Hammische (2010) and later Dechenaux 
et al. (2014) reported studies of the Downs-Thomson paradox (Downs 1962; Thomson 1977). This 
paradox states that improving the capacity of one of the two routes in a network may lead to more 
commuters switching from the public to the private route, thereby increasing travel costs of all the 
commuters. Rapoport et al. (2006, 2009, 2014) and Gisches and Rapoport (2012) reported several 
studies of the Braess paradox (Braess 1968) stating that, paradoxically, adding a single link that 
connects two parallel and congestible routes in a directed network from a common origin to a 
common destination may increase the travel time of the network users. The joint outcome of these 
studies provides strong support for equilibrium predictions when the architecture of the network 
is enriched, group size assumes different values, the stage game is iterated sufficiently many times, 
and the group members are homogenous. In these studies, there is no evidence in support of 
outcomes that maximize group welfare as opposed to equilibrium outcomes that are inferior in 
social welfare. 
Like these previous papers, the present study focuses on directed networks in which users 
choose their routes with no central authority to manage the flow. In sharp contrast to most of them, 
which focus on congestible games, we focus on ridesharing in which route choices may impose 
positive externalities on other users, since the benefits of choosing the ridesharing route are an 




increasing function of the number of the network users choosing the same route; see Anshelevich 
et al. (2004) for an example of a theoretical treatment, and Furuhata et al. (2013) for a literature 
review. We take forward the modelling analysis of previous works and present here a class of 
related social dilemmas with supporting experimental evidence.   
We conclude this section with a brief review of a previous experimental study that is more 
directly related to the present study. Liu et al. (2015) reports the results of an experiment on choice 
of routes between a single origin and a single destination. The cost of one of the three routes – 
called the private route – was fixed in one of their two experimental conditions, and drawn 
randomly for each player in the second condition from a commonly known distribution. The travel 
cost on either of the two additional routes, called the public routes, was shared equally among 
players choosing the same route. In the first condition, the players were homogenous with equal 
private cost, and in the second condition they were not. Whereas the network game in Liu et al. 
(2015) has three pure-strategy equilibria, the game in the present study has only a single 
equilibrium. Importantly, the best equilibrium outcome in Liu et al. maximizes group welfare. 
Therefore, their study is about whether players could coordinate their decisions to maximize 
welfare. In contrast, the equilibrium in each of the two conditions of the present study is inferior 
to the group welfare-maximizing outcome, so that our study is not about coordination to attain an 
optimal equilibrium.  
3 Theoretical Analysis 
3.1 The Cost-sharing Game 
Consider the following scenario faced by a group of n persons, who happen to fly together 
to attend a conference, football match, public concert, or a wedding ceremony. After their flight 
has landed, the travelers disembark from the airplane and each of them needs to choose between 




ordering a taxicab to her hotel (e.g., to freshen up, register to the hotel, etc.) or ridesharing on a 
van directly to the conference/football match/concert hall/wedding hall. The ridesharing option 
has a limited capacity that is n. The choice between the private (taxicab) and public (ridesharing) 
modes of transportation is made individually and independently.  
The cost of taking a taxicab varies from one person to another depending on the location 
of the person’s hotel; some are close to the airport and some are far away; see Figure 1 for a 
schematic representation of the distances. Meanwhile, persons who choose ridesharing would be 
splitting the travel cost equally. It might have been presumed that these travelers, with asymmetric 
private (taxicab) costs, could have freely bargained among themselves to achieve a cooperative 
game-theoretic allocation that is asymmetric (see e.g., Moulin 2003, Section 5.1). Here, we assume 
that time and other social or market constraints deprive the travelers from the opportunity of 
extended negotiation, so that ridesharing travelers share the cost equally as a rule. We also assume 
that the public mode of transportation travels along a special lane (e.g., a carpool or high-
occupancy vehicle lane) that incurs a different total cost from any of the private route costs. 
– Insert Figure 1 about here – 
The cost-sharing model in this study is a stylization of the above scenario. In the model, a 
group of n players could choose sharing their travel costs in the fashion of ridesharing. Specifically, 
the network has two modes of transportation that are modeled by n+1 directed routes. Of these are 
n routes, each one exclusive to each of the n players, with fixed travel costs that differ widely from 
one player to another. We refer to these routes as private routes, and denote each of them by (O, 
Dj), j = 1, 2, …, n. The network also includes an additional route, called the public route, which 
may accommodate all the n players. The players who choose this route share its travel cost, denoted 
as c, equally. Denote the number of players who choose the public route in the game as i (i = 0, 1, 




…, n). Then the travel cost of a player on the public route is simply c/i. Regardless of the values 
of the (fixed) travel costs on their respective private routes, the more players choosing to travel on 
the public route (i.e., the larger is i), the lower their individual travel costs. Routes are chosen 
independently with complete information about the cost structure. Since each private route is 
exclusive to some player, we use the same indices for private route and player. Hence, denote a 
player by j, j = 1, 2, … n, and her travel cost on her exclusive private route by cj, cj > 0. With no 
loss of generality, order the players such that cj > cj+1 > 0 for all j.  
3.2 The Cost Structures for the Experiment 
In order to illustrate the social dilemma, we focus on a scenario with a group of n = 10 
players with a particular set of private route costs as shown in the top panel of Table 1. These costs 
follow the formula cj = (100/j)-7 with each result rounded down to the nearest integer. For example, 
the private route cost is 93 for player j=1, 43 for player j=2, and so on down to cj =3 for player j = 
10; the players are highly heterogeneous in that the highest and lowest private route costs differ 
from each other by a factor of 31. If all the 10 players choose their private routes, then the total 
travel cost is c1 + c2 + …+ c10 = 221 (see top panel of Table 1). The same private route cost structure 
was used throughout the experimental sessions.  
The public, cost-sharing vehicle is assumed to have a capacity of n = 10. For the total travel 
cost on the public, cost-sharing route, we focus on two levels that are used in our experiment to 
define two between-subjects experimental conditions. Specifically (see the right-hand column of 
the bottom panel of Table 1), the total travel cost on the public route is c = cH = 120 for Condition 
H (for “high”), and c = cL = 60 for Condition L (for “low”). In the experiment, we rounded down 
the shared cost to the nearest integer whenever needed, so that the shared costs are as listed in 




Table 1. In both conditions, the sum of the private route costs across all the 10 players (i.e., 221) 
exceeds the total cost of the public route: c1 + c2 + …+ c10 > cg for g {L, H}.  
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
Inspection of Table 1 shows that each of the 10 players in Condition H would prefer 
choosing her private route rather than being the only player who chooses cost-sharing: cj < cH for 
j{1, 2, …, 10}. Moreover, the five players with the lowest private travel costs (players 6 through 
10) in Condition H will always prefer the private route as cj < cH/10 for j{6, 7, 8, 9, 10}. In 
contrast, player j=1 in Condition L, who has the highest private travel cost, would prefer choosing 
the public route as c1 > cL, whereas players 8, 9, and 10 in Condition L, who have the lowest private 
costs, would prefer traveling on the private route, as cj < cL/10. To continue this line of thinking, 
the middle panel of Table 1 lists the critical mass for each player in each condition: the critical 
mass is defined as the minimum number of players other than that player, who have chosen the 
public route in order for the public route to be at least as preferred as the private route. 
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis; the Social Dilemmas 
To generate theoretical predictions for the model, we conduct an analysis focused on pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium solutions. In these solutions, i* players choose the public route 
(ridesharing) and the remaining n-i* players choose the private route (taxicab), where i* is an 
integer in {0, 1, 2 …n}. Recall that we rank order the indices j of the players so that cj > cj+1 for j 
= 1, 2, … n-1. If, in equilibrium, player j > 1 chooses the public route, then player j-1 must find 
the public route preferable to the private route, since that player could only face a higher cost for 
the private route than player j. Thus, in an interior equilibrium with i* players choosing the public 
route where n > i* > 0, those players must be player 1, 2, …, i*, while player i*+1, i*+2, …, n 




must be choosing their private routes. The feasibility conditions for the pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium must be: 
ci* ≥ c/i* and c/(i*+1) ≥ ci*+1. 
For the equilibrium in which i* = 0 (all the players choose the private routes), the feasibility 
condition must be c ≥ c1 and c/n ≥ cn. For the equilibrium in which i = n (all the players choose the 
public route), the feasibility condition must be cn ≥ c/n.  
As is apparent from the above results, a social dilemma occurs when c1 + c2 + …+ cn > c 
(so that all choosing the public route maximizes group welfare), but i* < n. Indeed, this is what 
happens in the two experimental conditions with n = 10.  
We first read off the parameters in Table 1 to ascertain which equilibrium is feasible for 
each condition. The only feasibility condition that is satisfied in Condition H is cH ≥ c1 and cg/10 
≥ c10. Hence, the unique pure-strategy equilibrium in Condition H is for all the 10 players to choose 
their respective private routes. The only feasibility condition that is satisfied in Condition L is c5 
≥ cL/5 ≥ c6. Hence, the unique pure-strategy equilibrium in Condition L is an interior one with 
players 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 choosing the public route and the remaining five players choosing their 
respective private routes. Equivalently, we can arrive at the same conclusions by appreciating that 
the critical mass (see Table 1) of a player is never lower than the player’s role index in Condition 
H, and is lower than the player’s role index in Condition L only for players 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. 
It is important to note that in both conditions, the total cost for all players would be 
minimized if all players were to choose the public route, because c1 + c2 + …+ c10 > cg for g {L, 
H}. However, this outcome is not the equilibrium in either of the conditions, as i* < 10 in both 
conditions. That is, both equilibria are not welfare maximizing for the group, resulting in a social 
dilemma in either condition. The upshot is that, in equilibrium in Condition H, the total cost to the 




group (221) is 1.84 times the welfare-maximizing total cost of 120, if all players choose the public 
route – a substantial “price of anarchy” as discussed in Mak and Rapoport (2013). In the 
equilibrium in Condition L, the total cost to the group (88) is 1.47 times the welfare-maximizing 
total cost of 60. 
It is also important to note that the games in both conditions are dominance solvable, and 
the equilibria may be constructed by elimination of dominated strategies. For example, in 
Condition H, players 6 to 10 find the private route a strictly dominant strategy, since their private 
costs are lower than the minimum public route cost of 12 even when all the players choose that 
route. Therefore, players 1 to 5 (who would have preferred the public route had all players chosen 
it) could reason that at most only five players might choose the public route, meaning that the cost 
of the public route would be at least 24, which is higher than the private route costs of players 4 
and 5. This reasoning leads to an iterated elimination of dominated strategies, a disincentivizing 
effect in which players 1 to 3 could now reason that players 4 and 5 would also not choose the 
public route. Thus, at most three players might choose the public route with a minimum cost of 
40, where player 3 would find it preferable to choose her private route as well. Two more iterations 
lead to even player 1, with the highest private cost, to opt out of choosing the public route. Thus, 
no player in Condition H chooses the public route in equilibrium. These are iterations in reasoning, 
which might happen as part of the players’ strategic thinking before anyone commits to any choice.  
Similarly, in Condition L, players 1 to 7 might have benefitted from ridesharing had all the 
players chosen it. In contrast, players 8, 9, 10 find that their private route is a strictly dominant 
strategy. In turn, this leads to an iterated elimination of dominated strategies, a disincentivizing 
effect that results in players 6 and 7 refraining from the public route. As a result, only half of the 




population choose the public route in equilibrium. Again, these iterations in reasoning could 
happen before anyone commits to any choice, leading to an instantaneous social dilemma.  
4 The Experiment 
In this section, we report an experimental game designed to simulate in a controlled laboratory 
environment the two conditions discussed in the previous section. The overall objective of the 
experiment is to gauge the descriptive validity of the social dilemmas and their welfare impact.  
It is not a forgone conclusion that the social dilemmas, in the form of convergence of 
decisions towards the respective equilibria, would occur empirically. The participants in 
Conditions H and L were instructed that the stage game would be repeated in the experiment 80 
times with random assignment of player roles upon each repetition. This provided a strong 
incentive for the participants to choose the public route collectively and thereby achieve a socially 
optimal low mean cost across iterations of the stage game. As we report below, the participants 
seemed to ignore this incentive and quickly converged to the socially inferior equilibrium. 
4.1 Participants 
Two hundred participants in approximately equal proportions of males and females took 
part in the experiment. The participants were mostly undergraduate students, who volunteered to 
take part in a decision-making experiment for payoff contingent on their performance. One 
hundred participants were assigned randomly to each of the two conditions (Conditions H and L) 
in a between-subjects design. For each condition, there were 10 sessions (groups) of 10 players 
each, which differed from each other only in the total travel cost of the public route.  
4.2 Design and Procedure 
Upon entering the laboratory, the participants were seated randomly in separate cubicles; 
communication between them was not possible. Each participant was handed written instructions 




(see Online Appendix A), which she read at her own pace. The instructions presented a network 
diagram with 11 routes in a “diamond” form. The “diamond” format was simply a means to 
visualize the cost structures for the participants. If the travel cost on the private route is broken 
into two parts, namely, cj for the first arm of the link and 0 for the second arm, then the network 
in Figure 1 and the network displayed in the instructions (Online Appendix A) are topologically 
equivalent. In particular, the two networks are also equivalent in terms of the strategic interactions 
and the implied social dilemmas. 
The instructions explained the cost structure in detail, and the computation of the payoff 
was illustrated with a numerical example. The participants were informed that the game would be 
repeated for 80 identical rounds, and that on each round they would be randomly assigned a player 
role. They also were informed that the payoff for each round (in experimental tokens) would be 
determined by subtracting their travel cost from a reward of 50 tokens for reaching their destination. 
The value of the reward was deliberately set sufficiently low to ensure sensitivity to travel costs 
(the higher the reward, the less important the perceived differences between the costs), and yet 
sufficiently high to reduce the likelihood of multiple rounds with negative payoffs. Player roles 
were assigned randomly subject to the constraint that every participant was assigned each of the 
10 player roles an equal number (i.e., eight) of times in the experimental session.  
At the beginning of each round, each participant was presented with a computer screen 
showing her player role j, and the tabulated private route costs of all the n players. The screen also 
had two clickable buttons, one corresponding to each route, for the participant to submit her 
decision. At the end of the round, the program displayed a second computer screen that presented 
to each participant her player role, the cost structure, the route that she had chosen, her payoff for 
the round, the number of players who had chosen the private route, and the complementary number 




of the players who had chosen the public route (see Online Appendix A). Each participant could 
access at any time a personal history screen, which listed her previous route choices with their 
associated payoffs. 
At the end of the session, each participant was paid in cash a $5.00 participation bonus plus 
her cumulative earnings according to the exchange rate $1.00 = 110 tokens. The mean participant 
payment was $24.7 and $34.7 for Conditions H and L, respectively, including the $5.00 bonus. 
Each session lasted approximately one hour on average. 
5 Results 
– Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here – 
5.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Recall that in the equilibrium in Condition H, all the 10 group members choose the private 
route; while in Condition L, players 1-5 choose the public route, and players 6-10 choose the 
private route. Note also that because the cost-sharing game in the experiment was repeated 80 
times with player roles randomly re-assigned on each round, the participants had an incentive to 
deviate from equilibrium and choose the public route to maximize the mean individual payoff as 
well as the group welfare in the session. However, this strategy was not widely adopted by any 
group in the experiment. In both conditions, participants started out far from the social optimum 
and quickly converged around the theoretical, equilibrium outcomes, which were grossly inferior 
in terms of group welfare. 
Table 2 displays for each group separately the mean number or choice frequencies of the 
participants traversing the public route in each of the four blocks of 20 rounds in the experimental 
sessions. Overall means by group and block, as well as the overall per player travel cost in each 
group, are also listed in the table. Lastly, the equilibrium prediction and social optimum (i.e., when 
the group would have minimized their total travel cost) are also listed for comparison.  




5.1.1 Non-significant Deviations from Equilibrium Prediction 
Overall, the groups in the two conditions converged quickly towards their respective and 
very different equilibria. With group as the unit of analysis, the choice frequencies of the public 
route in both conditions were significantly different even from round 1. The mean choice 
frequencies of the public route in round 1 were 2.70 (1.16) in Condition H and 4.00 (1.25) in 
Condition L, respectively (standard deviations in parentheses). The difference between these two 
means is statistically significant according to a t-test comparison with group as the unit of analysis 
(t(18)=2.41, p = 0.027). Subsequently, in every block in Condition L the overall mean choice 
frequencies of the public route (see Table 2) rose from around the equilibrium prediction of 5 (p > 
0.05 in t-test comparisons for deviations from equilibrium in blocks 1 and 2, with group as the unit 
of analysis) to a higher level of 5.53 on average in both blocks 3 and 4. The latter mean choice 
frequency was numerically just above the equilibrium prediction but was statistically significantly 
different from it (p < 0.05 in t-test comparisons for blocks 3 and 4 also with group as the unit of 
analysis). See Section 5.2 for further discussion on the reasons behind this deviation. 
Similar standard statistical tests for deviations from equilibrium do not apply to Condition 
H because the equilibrium choice frequency of the public route is the floor value of zero. However, 
the convergence in this condition is clearly evident in Table 2 as well as Figure 2, which exhibits 
the mean choice frequencies across all 10 groups of the public route by round in both conditions.  
Overall, the mean choice frequencies of the public route in Conditions H and L differ 
significantly: 0.39 in Condition H vs. 5.36 in Condition L, t(18)=23.0, p < 0.01, with group as the 
unit of analysis.   
5.1.2 Significant Deviations from Social Optimum; Welfare Impact  




As shown in Table 2, the choice frequencies of the public route are clearly different from 
the social optimum where all players choose the ridesharing option. As the social optimum 
benchmarks are all ceiling (for choice frequencies of the public route) or floor (for per player travel 
cost) values, standard statistical tests do not apply. However, the gap between observed values and 
the social optimum are distinctly wide, especially given the standard deviations.  
Importantly, the 10 groups in both conditions suffered severe welfare losses relative to their 
potential social optimum. The overall individual mean travel cost in Condition H was 22.94, which 
was almost double the social optimum value of 12; likewise, the overall mean travel cost of a 
player in Condition L was 9.18, which was 1.53 times the social optimum value of 6. In other 
words, the participants in our experiment left a lot of money on the table, thereby suffering 
substantial empirical prices of anarchy (Mak and Rapoport 2013) of 1.91 and 1.53 in Conditions 
H and L, respectively. 
5.1.3 Within-session Evolution 
Table 2 and Figure 2 also show that the participants in both conditions approached the 
equilibrium rather quickly and their route choices overall stabilizing just above the equilibrium 
level. As indicated in Table 2(a) (column 13), in Condition H there was some learning over the 
first half (i.e., the first two blocks or Rounds 1-40) of the session. Afterwards, the choice 
frequencies of the public route stabilized just above the equilibrium prediction (with floor value of 
zero). There was typically some noisy attempts by a few individuals to pull the group out of the 
equilibrium, especially in Group H10 (see Figure A.1 in Online Appendix B); however, such 
attempts were largely unsuccessful in causing large-scale deviations from equilibrium. Similarly, 
in Condition L there was some learning over the first half of the session after which fluctuations 
persisted until the end of the session, with choice frequencies of the public route converging 




slightly above the equilibrium level of 5. The observations reported in this subsection are 
consistent with supplemental Figures A.1 and A.2 in Online Appendix B, which exhibit the choice 
frequencies of the public route in each group in Conditions H and L.  
5.2 Deviations from Equilibrium; Analysis by Player Role 
On average, the deviations from equilibrium in Condition H accounted for only 3.88 
percent of choice observations (31.0 out of 800 decisions per group on average). When calculated 
separately for the two halves of the session (Rounds 1-40 and Rounds 41-80), the mean deviation 
score dropped sharply from 6.55 percent in the first half to 1.20 percent in the second half. This is 
borne out in the top panel of Figure 3, which exhibits the number of deviations from equilibrium 
by player role for the first and second half of the session separately. Player roles are exhibited on 
the horizontal axis, and the frequencies of deviations on the vertical axis. The sharp drop in 
deviations is apparent in the panel. This is especially drastic among players 1 - 5, who might have 
lowered their travel costs by choosing the public route had the other players chose that route as 
well. When the participants were playing in these roles, they were much more likely to deviate 
from equilibrium, but only in the first half of the session; in the second half of the session they all 
had learned to follow equilibrium in whichever player role they were in. A within-subjects 10 
(Player roles) × 2 (first vs. second half of the session) ANOVA of the number of deviations, with 
group as the unit of analysis, yields a significant main effect over the two halves of the session 
(F(1,9)=29.14, p < 0.01), together with main effect in player role as well as interaction effect, both 
at p < 0.01. These learning effects are all consistent with Figure 3 as well as the within-session 
evolution analysis. 
– Insert Figure 3 about here – 




Deviations from equilibrium in Condition L were much higher at 11.31 percent of the 
choice observations (90.5 out of 800 per group on average). Deviations in this condition persisted 
throughout the session but with a slight decline as the session progressed: the percentage of route 
choices that deviated from equilibrium was 13.25 percent in the first half and 9.38 percent in the 
second half of the session. This is also borne out in the bottom panel of Figure 3. A within-subjects 
10 (player roles) × 2 (first vs. second half of the session) ANOVA of the number of deviations, 
with group as the unit of analysis, yields a significant main effect over the two halves of the 
sessions (F(1,9)=10.28, p=.011).  
In Condition L, deviations from equilibrium could be in the form of choosing the private 
route when the equilibrium choice was the public route (player roles 1-5), or choosing the public 
route when the equilibrium choice was the private route (player roles 6-10). As is evident in Figure 
3, the deviations among player roles 1-5 dropped sharply across the two halves, but the deviations 
from equilibrium among player roles 6-10 were not very different between the two halves. 
Correspondingly, in the preceding ANOVA, there was a significant main effect for player role 
(F(9,81)=10.54, p<.01) as well as an interaction effect (F(9,81)=4.39, p<.01). The persistent 
imbalance in deviations by player roles results in the observed positive deviations in number of 
players choosing the public route even in those rounds, which is consistent with the within-session 
evolution analysis. 
5.2.1 Further Discussion on Deviations in Condition L and Inequity Aversion  
Why did some level of deviations from equilibrium persist throughout the session among 
player roles 6-10 in Condition L? Note that, by definition, those players had no individual 
incentives to deviate unilaterally from equilibrium by choosing the public route. In fact, even the 
welfare-maximizing outcome held little attraction (if at all) for these player roles. Specifically, 




player roles 6 and 7 could improve their travel costs by 3 and 1 tokens (relative to their respective 
private route costs) if all choose the public route; player roles 8-10 could not improve at all, and 
in fact should choose the private route as a dominant strategy. Yet experimental participants in 
these player roles chose the public route with consistent frequencies. Note that these results are 
partially within-subjects in nature because of the random reassignment of roles from round to 
round; that is, it seems that some participants deviated from equilibrium to different extents in 
different roles, and persistently so through the session. A simple explanation based on a lack of 
equilibrium reasoning may not be able to account for such asymmetry in deviations. The 
observations thus call for an explanation beyond attempts at self-interest maximization.  
One possibility is that participants cared about relative payoffs in the form of inequity 
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). In the present experimental game, the private route costs are 
highly heterogeneous. As shown in Table 1, the cost for player role 1 is 93 tokens, for player role 
4 it is 18 tokens, and for player role 10 it is 3 tokens. The corresponding ratios are 31:1 for player 
roles 1 and 10, and 6:1 for player roles 4 and 10. These are enormous differences. Thus, a player 
who chooses the private route might experience significant disadvantageous inequality if his/her 
player role incurs a relatively high travel cost on the private route, such as for player role 1 or 2. 
Likewise, a player who chooses the private route might experience advantageous inequality if 
his/her player role incurs a relative low private route cost, such as for player role 9 or 10. On the 
other hand, when all the players choose the public route, there is no inequality; even when only a 
few group members choose the public route, those choosing it can experience complete equality 
among themselves.  
As such, inequity aversion might motivate a player to choose the public route when 
equilibrium prescribes choosing the private route. This possibility applies to any player in 




Condition H and player roles 6-10 in Condition L. In Condition H, as is evident from our data 
analysis, if deviations had been partially motivated by inequity aversion (in addition to attempts to 
reduce travel costs), the deviations declined as the session progressed. Meanwhile, in Condition 
L, deviations from player roles 6-10 persisted throughout the session, and might have arisen from 
aversion to advantageous inequality. That is, if participants in player roles 6-10 were averse to 
advantageous inequality, they might be willing to choose the public route for the sake of equality 
even if that meant sacrificing some amount of self-interest; after all, the amount to be sacrificed 
was typically not considerable (see also Section 5.3.1). Our data are consistent with this possibility. 
5.3 Individual-level Analysis 
       We next report individual-level analysis that offers additional insights into the choice 
behavior in the experiment. In each of the 10 groups in Condition H, 85 percent of the participants 
deviated not more than five times, and most of these deviations took place at the beginning of the 
session. In contrast, in Condition L the range of individual deviations (between 0 and 43) was more 
pronounced. Nevertheless, the distributions are highly skewed by outliers; in every one of the 10 
groups in Condition H at least half of the participants deviated not more than 10 times. These 
observations are supplemented by Figure A.3 in Online Appendix B, which exhibits box-and-
whisker plots of the distribution of individual players’ number of deviations from equilibrium 
choice. 
– Insert Table 3 about here – 
5.3.1 Why was Convergence around Equilibrium Prevalent?  
We next compute the correlations, separately for each condition, between a player’s total 
travel cost in the session and his/her total number of deviations from equilibrium route choice. The 
correlation coefficients are 0.70 and 0.65 for Conditions H and L, respectively; both values are 




positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01). These results imply a high payoff sacrifice when 
not following equilibrium route choice. We further confirm the results by linear regressions of 
individual travel cost on individual number of deviations from equilibrium over all rounds. We 
conducted a regression for each condition separately with participant as the unit of analysis. To 
account for correlations among data points, we used the GEE (General Estimating Equations, 
Liang and Zeger 1986) approach through the GENMOD procedure in SAS. The GEE approach 
does not require a full specification of the underlying correlational structure of the data; it yields 
estimations by iteratively solving a system of equations based on quasi-likelihood distributional 
assumptions. The results are listed in Table 3, which shows that the relevant regression coefficients 
are as follows (standard error in parentheses): Condition H: 26.47 (1.72); Condition L: 8.17 (1.95).  
Even if the participants had realized that they should maximize overall payoffs throughout 
the session by repeatedly choosing the public route, such attempts must have proved to be very 
costly, and as a result were adopted infrequently. For example, in Condition H, the average cost 
in equilibrium is 22.1 (see Table 2(a)). A participant could do better than that through always 
choosing the public route only if at least six participants in total consistently deviated from 
equilibrium by choosing the public route. For Condition L, the average cost in equilibrium is 8.8; 
a participant could do better than that through always choosing the public route only if at least 
seven participants in total consistently chose the public route, which is two more than the 
equilibrium choice frequency. Without communication and binding agreements, our participants 
were unable to achieve that. These observations help explaining why convergence to the deficient 
equilibrium, rather than the social optimum, was so prevalent in our experiment. 
As discussed in the previous subsection, deviations from equilibrium in Condition L could 
be in the form of taking the private route when the equilibrium prescribes choosing the ridesharing 




public route (player roles 1-5) or vice versa (players roles 6-10). Therefore, we refined our analysis 
by conducting for Condition L a linear regression of individual travel cost over rounds when the 
participant was in player roles 1-5, on individual number of deviations from equilibrium in those 
same rounds, with the participant as the unit of analysis and with standard errors clustered by 
groups. We then conducted a similar regression for the players in roles 6-10. The results yield 
consistent positive coefficients for the relevant number of deviations variable (see Table 3): for 
player roles 1-5, the coefficient (standard error in parentheses) is 20.25 (2.56); for player roles 6-
10, the coefficient is 3.27 (0.35). We also carried out a series of similar regression analysis for 
each role separately. We find that travel cost is significantly and positively related to the relevant 
number of deviations for all the roles (p < 0.01) except for role 6, where the coefficient is 0.55 
with standard error 0.29, and is marginally significantly different from zero (p = 0.068). This result 
may be explained by the fact that, for player role 6, the travel costs of the private and public routes 
differ by only a single payoff unit when the rest of the group members are playing according to 
equilibrium (see Table 1).   
Lastly, recall that the overall estimated coefficient is 8.17, a value that is closer to the 
coefficient for player roles 6-10. This is because a predominant 65.75 percent (595 out of 905) of 
the deviations in Condition L were by participants in player roles 6-10, which is understandable 
given that the potential additional cost in deviation (risking public instead of the prescribed private 
route) for those player roles is much lower than that for player roles 1-5 (see the previous 
subsection). The same observation explains why the coefficient for player roles 6-10 is noticeably 
lower than for player roles 1-5. It also helps explaining why deviations from player roles 6-10 
could persist throughout the session. 
6 Concluding Remarks 




We investigate a class of social dilemmas that arise in decision scenarios involving a joint 
enterprise such as ridesharing. In these dilemmas, a group of individuals potentially benefit from 
participating in the enterprise, such as sharing the transportation cost in a ridesharing arrangement. 
The benefit of the enterprise increases with the total number of participants, and social welfare is 
maximized if there is full participation by all the group members. However, if a few of the group 
members find it always preferable to opt out, then the potential benefit from the joint initiative will 
also decrease, leading to more group members opting out. This iterated disincentivizing effect – a 
manifestation of the iterated elimination of dominated strategies – might result in massive welfare 
losses. As discussed earlier, this class of social dilemmas are inherently different from well-known 
major social dilemmas, such as the classic public goods and threshold public goods games. 
We construct a model to demonstrate the social dilemmas theoretically as well as 
experimentally. For the latter purpose, we conducted a computer-controlled experiment using a 
stylized traffic network with a group of 10 participants who were assigned heterogeneous roles. In 
our design, the players are asked to choose repeatedly between either a private route with a fixed 
travel cost or a public, ridesharing route with which the travel cost is shared equally with other 
players. The cost structures across the two experimental conditions only differ from each other in 
the total travel cost on the public route. In both conditions, group members are assigned widely 
dispersed costs for their own exclusive private routes. Correspondingly, the theoretical predictions, 
which are not welfare maximizing for the group, are for all the players in the high-cost condition 
and half of the players in the low-cost condition to choose the private route. In both conditions, 
the outcome that maximizes group welfare is for all the group members to choose the public route 
and share the travel cost equally. 




Our stylized model is inspired by a story about people who happen to fly together to attend 
a public event such as a conference or a football match (Section 3.1). Our experimental design 
involves repeated play of a stage game that replicates this scenario in the laboratory, with random 
reassignment of private route costs (i.e., player roles) from round to round. The random role 
assignment might be motivated by scenarios such as researchers in the same field attending the 
same conference every year but incurring different private route costs each time – which could be 
due to changes in conference locations in the same city and personal reasons such as budget 
constraints, staying in the same hotel with friends, and sharing hotel rooms. Our design essentially 
assumes that, while private route costs can change from year to year, the distribution of these costs 
among the players is approximately the same. More generally, this repeated scenario captures the 
case where the same individuals periodically choosing between paying for varying individual 
usage costs and sharing a fixed pooled cost. Further illustrative examples include a group of friends 
who periodically choose between paying individually for their mobile data usages or sharing a 
plan; or a neighborhood of residents who periodically choose between contracting garbage 
collection services individually based on volume of garbage (which is a function of family size) 
or sharing these services under a fixed monthly fee. 
Our experimental results support the descriptive validity of the theorized social dilemmas 
in these scenarios and exhibit their drastic welfare impact. It seems that the participants in the 
experiment readily and quickly followed strategic reasoning that led them towards equilibrium 
choices – a general conclusion that is only qualified by slight deviations in Condition L that might 
have been driven by inequity aversion (see Section 5.2). As a result, inferior outcomes emerged at 
the very start of the experimental session in both conditions and did not improve as the session 
progressed. It might have been expected that random reassignment of player roles from round to 




round could rationalize long-term collusion to maximize mean session payoff, so that every 
participant would choose the public route in every round. This is especially reasonable for 
Condition L as even its lower private route costs are not highly superior to the equilibrium cost on 
the public route (Table 1). However, this was not the case in the experiment, and the outcome 
serves as another example of the validity of the equilibrium prediction when large groups (with no 
ability to communicate effectively) are concerned. Perhaps random reassignment of player roles 
also meant that repeating the same signal to collude on two or more consecutive rounds was 
difficult. Further research is warranted on facilitating tacit collusion in this class of social 
dilemmas, such as through communication, rewards, and other means of norm setting. 
 The social dilemmas that we study have potentially important implications. From consumer 
ridesharing to management of collaborative teams, our work highlights the importance of 
motivating individuals who would find it least beneficial to partake in the relevant joint initiatives. 
Not only their own non-participation will impact group welfare and team performance; the iterative 
disincentivizing effect on other individuals could lead to much higher levels of non-participation 
with severe financial consequences. Even when high participation level in cost sharing or 
collaboration is obviously beneficial to the group, it could take only a few individuals’ non-
participation to undermine the whole enterprise. If those few individuals might be persuaded that 
a critical number of other individuals would also participate, and that differential benefits to 
collaboration might be reversed in future interactions, it would be possible to appeal to their 
forward-looking thinking and self-control (see, e.g., Kocher et al. 2017) in order to rally consistent 
support for collaboration. As our experiment demonstrates, if such initiatives might ever be 
efficacious they should be best carried out with very consistent and emphatic communications – 
or the enterprise would still falter. 




A major future research direction is concerned with how the social dilemma might be 
averted by structural changes in the model design. For example, is it possible for a policy maker 
to cost/subsidize the system in a way to mitigate the social dilemma and its inefficiency? 
Specifically, the policy maker might tax private route transportation to an extent that even the 
lowest private route cost is at least higher than the public route cost when all choose the public 
route (i.e., cn’ > c/n, where cn’ is the total private route cost of player role n including tax). In that 
case, all group members choosing the public route is an equilibrium. However, there might be 
multiple equilibria and the efficient equilibrium might be unstable. As such, this and other policy 
possibilities warrant future theoretical and experimental research. 
Yet another non-structural way to avert the dilemma is by pre-play communication. Our 
analysis of the results shows that a few participants did try occasionally to change the course of 
the game by deviating from equilibrium play. With no pre-play communication, the other group 
members either ignored these signals, misinterpreted them as errors, or mistrusted them. Pre-play 
communication in the present setup provides a mechanism to avert the social dilemma by pointing 
out the long-tern financial benefits to all the group members due to the random assignment of 
player roles that allows each member to play each of the ten roles with equal probability. 
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Table 1 Characteristics of the private and public routes 
(a) The Private Route Costs and Associated Critical Masses by Condition 
Player (j) 1H  2H 3H 4H 5H 6HL 7HL 8HL 9HL 10HL Total 
Private route cost = cj 93 43 26 18 13 9 7 5 4 3 221 
Critical mass 
Condition H: 
Public route cost = 120/i 
1 2 4 6 8 Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
 
Condition L: 
Public route cost = 60/i 
0 1 2 3 4 6 7 Nil Nil Nil 
 
 
(b) The Public Route Costs 
No. of players choosing 
the public route (i) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
Condition H: 
Public route cost = 120/i 
120 60 40 30 24 20 17 15 13 12 120 
Condition L: 
Public route cost= 60/i 
60 30 20 15 12 10 8 7 6 6 60 
 
Notes: The top panel displays the travel costs on the 10 private routes. It also lists the 
associated critical masses by player role and condition. For each player indexed by role, the critical 
mass in a condition is the minimum number of players other than that player who have chosen the 
public route in order for the public route to be at least as preferred as the private route. “Nil” entries 
mean that a critical mass does not exist for the associated player in the context of the game, as the 
private route strictly dominates the public route for that player. In addition, in the top panel, the 
superscripts H and L in the first row indicate whether the corresponding player chooses the private 
route in equilibrium in Conditions H and L, respectively. The bottom panel lists the costs on the 
single public route dependent on the number of players on it by condition.  
 




Table 2 Mean choice frequencies of the public route by condition, group, and block (20 rounds each) with the session overall mean 
travel costs per player, the equilibrium predictions (“Eq.”), and the social optima 
(a) Condition H 












1-20 0.60 0.80 1.65 1.20 1.40 0.25 0.80 1.05 0.35 2.10 1.02 (0.58) 0 10 
21-40 0.05 0.05 0.50 0.35 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.05 1.25 0.29** (0.40) 0 10 
41-60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.55 0.17 (0.49) 0 10 
61-80 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.08 (0.22) 0 10 
Session 
overall 
0.16 0.23 0.54 0.41 0.49 0.06 0.20 0.29 0.10 1.40 0.39 (0.39) 0 10 
Mean travel cost  
per player  
(session overall) 
22.83 22.73 23.13 23.26 23.03 22.29 22.95 22.52 22.60 24.05 22.94 (0.49) 22.1 12 
  




(b)  Condition L 












1-20 4.60 6.30 4.05 4.90 3.95 4.90 5.10 4.80 5.05 5.65 4.93 (0.69) 5 10 
21-40 5.05 6.20 4.30 6.20 5.25 5.35 6.30 4.95 5.40 5.30 5.43* (0.64) 5 10 
41-60 4.90 6.15 4.40 5.90 5.75 5.05 6.10 5.60 5.45 6.05 5.53 (0.59) 5 10 
61-80 4.75 6.15 4.65 6.30 5.65 5.00 6.50 5.55 5.55 5.20 5.53 (0.64) 5 10 
Session 
overall 
4.83 6.20 4.35 5.83 5.15 5.08 6.00 5.23 5.36 5.55 5.36 (0.56) 5 10 
Mean travel cost  
per player  
(session overall) 
9.34 8.13 11.28 8.39 9.06 8.96 8.48 9.43 10.20 8.51 9.18 (0.96) 8.8 6 
 
Notes: Each group in Conditions H and L is denoted as H1-H10 and L1-L10, respectively. The “Block overall” column includes 
standard deviations in parentheses with group as the unit of analysis. Where the observed mean choice frequencies of the public route 
between every pair of successive blocks are significantly different according to a pairwise t-test, the block overall entry for the later 
block is marked by one or more asterisks (* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01).  




Table 3  GEE regression results of individual travel cost on number of deviations from 
equilibrium 
 Condition H 
Condition L Condition L 
(All Roles) Roles 1-5 Roles 6-10 
# Observations 8,000 8,000 4,000 4,000 
Intercept 1,752.9(13.8)** 660.2 (8.93)** 430.1 (8.86)** 221.9 (1.01)** 
# Deviations 
from equilibrium 
26.47 (1.72)** 8.17 (1.95)* 20.25 (2.56)** 3.27 (0.35)** 
QIC 101.3 117.0 110.9 111.9 
 
Notes: Each entry in rows 3-4 is the regression coefficient of the corresponding 
independent variable with standard error in parentheses; where an estimate is significantly 
different from zero, it is marked by one or more asterisks (* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01). QIC is the 
goodness-of-fit statistic for GEE. 
 
  








(1) Distances on the horizontal line are proportional to the travel costs on the private route. 
(2) To save space, we do not index the private routes except for routes 1, 2, and 3. 
(3) The experimental instructions have a different representation, but with equivalent 
strategic interactions and social dilemmas.  
  




Fig. 2 Mean choice frequencies of the public route by condition and round 
 
 
Note: The dotted line in every panel indicates the Nash equilibrium solution: no player choosing 
























































































Fig. 3 Number of deviations from equilibrium by condition and player role in the first and 
second half of the experimental session 
 
 
Note: Each bar indicates the total number of deviations out of 400 (= 40 rounds per half of a 




















































1st half (Round 1-40) 2nd half (Round 41-80)




When a Few Undermine the Whole: 
A Class of Social Dilemmas in Ridesharing 
 
Online Appendix A: Sample Instructions to Participants (Condition L) 
Introduction 
 
Welcome to this laboratory experiment on route choice in traffic networks. During this experiment, you 
will be asked to make a large number of decisions and so will the other participants. Your decisions, as well 
as the decisions of the other participants, will determine your monetary payoff according to the rules of the 
game that will be explained shortly. 
Please read the instructions carefully. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the 
supervisors will come to assist you. 
Note that hereafter communication between the participants is prohibited. If they communicate with 
one another in any shape or form, then the experiment will be terminated.  
The Route Selection Task 
      The experiment is computerized. You will make your decisions by clicking on the appropriate buttons 
that will appear on your screen (please do not use the keyboard). 
      There are 10 participants in the lab, who will play together as a group for the entire session. On each 
round of the experiment, each participant will be numbered randomly from 1 through 10. 
      In this experiment, you will participate in 80 identical rounds of a network routing game. On each round, 
you will be presented with a diagram of a traffic network with a single origin, a single destination, and 11 
different routes connecting them. Your task, as well as the task of all other participants, is to choose one of 
two routes to traverse: the first is a private route that only you can choose, and the other is a common 
pooled route that all other participants may choose as well.  
Description of the Game 




      Consider the traffic network that is exhibited in the diagram below. You are required to choose a route 
that connects the origin, denoted by the letter O (for Origin), to the final destination denoted by the letter 
D (for Destination).  
(Please study this diagram.) 
 
Traversing a network is always costly in terms of the time needed to complete each segment of the 
road, gas, tolls, etc. The above network has two types of routes; 10 private routes (top ten) and 1 pooled 
(bottom one). The travel costs are shown near the routes. For the private routes, they differ from one 
participant to another and are computed by the equation 

  7, where k indicates the participant number 
(from 1 to 10). For example, for participant #1 (top route) the cost is  

  7  93, for participant #2 
(second from top) it is 

	  7  43, and for participant #10 (second from bottom) it is 

  7  3.  
The cost of the common pooled route is the same for all the participants choosing it, and it depends on 
their number. For example, if only a single participant chooses it, then the cost for her would be  

  60. 
If two participants choose the pooled road, then the cost for each of them would be  

	  30, and if all 10 
participants choose it, then travel cost for each participant would be  

  6.  




At the end of each round, you will receive a reward of 50 for reaching the destination. Your earnings 
will be determined by subtracting your cost for the round from this reward. For example, if you are 
participant #5 and you chose the private road, then your cost on that round would be            

  7  17 
and your payoff would be 50    7  50  17  33. 
All the participants choose routes simultaneously and independently of one another, leaving the origin 
O and traveling to the destination D without knowing the other participants’ decisions.  
Example: 
Suppose that on a certain round you were assigned to be participant #1 and decided to choose your private 
route (top route), which is indicated below in blue. 
Suppose that participants #3, #5, #6, #9, #10 also chose their private routes as indicated in green. 
Finally, suppose that the remaining participants #2, #4, #7 and #8 chose the common pooled route (their 
private route remained black).  
At the end of such a round, the computer will display the results as in the screen below: 





The top part of the screen exhibits the network and the routes chosen by the 10 participants. The route 
that you chose is marked in blue (route #1). Private routes chosen by other participants are marked in green 
(routes #3, #5, #6, #9, and #10). Routes that remained black (#2, #4, #7, and #8) were not chosen by their 
respective participants, and hence those participants chose the pooled route.  
The bottom part of the screen displays your number for the present round of play (row 1); your choice 
on this round (row 2); your cost and your payoff (row 3); the number of participants who chose their private 
route (row 4); and in the last row the number of participants who chose the pooled route and their payoff.  
The table on the right gives more detail presenting the ten participants (1st column), the cost of their 
private routes (2nd column), their choice (3rd column), the resulting cost (4th column) and payoff (5th 
column). 
In this example, the payoff that you (participant #1) earned by choosing your private route: 
Travel cost: 

  7  93  




Earning: 50    7  50  93  43 
For the 5 participants who also chose the private route: 
Travel cost: 26, 13, 9, 4, 3 for player #3, #5, #6, #9, and #10, respectively. 
Earnings: 24, 37, 41, 46, 47, respectively. 
And for the 4 participants who chose the common pooled route: 
Travel cost: 

  15 
Individual earnings: 50    50  15  35 
Note that the payoff on the pooled route and some of the private routes may be negative. 
You will also be provided with a History screen (see example below) exhibiting your private route and 
payoff as well as the number of participants choosing the common pooled route and the associated payoff 
in all previous rounds. Your decision on each round is indicated in blue. If you did not choose your private 
route or no participant selected the common pooled route, then your payoff will be indicated as N/A. You 
may refer to the History screen at any time during the session.   
 
All 80 rounds will have exactly the same structure. 





At the beginning of each round, the computer will randomly assign you a role (i.e., your role will most 
likely change on each round) and display a network diagram similar to the one exhibited before. You will 
then be asked to choose either your private route or the common pooled route. To choose a route, simply 
use the mouse to click on it. The color of the route you choose will change to blue indicating your choice. 
To change your choice, please click on the route again and its color will change back to black. Once you 
are satisfied with your selection, please press the "Confirm" button. You will be asked to verify your choice.  
Once all the 10 participants confirm their choice of routes, the computer will automatically exhibit a 
feedback screen. After studying the summary information about the last round, you can click the “continue” 
button and proceed to the next round. 
Payments 
At the end of the experiment, you will be paid for your cumulative earnings in all the 80 rounds. You 
will be paid in cash for your earnings with an exchange rate of $1 = 110 tokens. In addition, you will receive 
a show up bonus of $5 for attending the experiment.  
Once you are certain that you understand the task, please place the instructions on the table in front of 
you to indicate that you have completed reading them. If you have any questions, please raise your hand 
and one of the supervisors will come to assist you. 








Online Appendix B: Additional Figures 
Fig. A.1. The choice frequencies of the public route by group and round in Condition H 


































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. A.2. The choice frequencies of the public route by group and round in Condition L 




































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. A.3. Box-and-whisker plots showing the distribution of individual players’ total number of 
deviations from equilibrium throughout the session, by condition and group. 
 
 
Condition L 
Condition H 
